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INSURANCE PROTECTION AND DAMAGE AWARDS
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
OLIVER CHARLES SCHROEDER, JR. *
INSURANCE PROTECTION
Some Conceptual Differences
Doctors suspect law. Their suspicions are based on many and
complex causes. No causes, however, are more irritating than the
malpractice insurance policy which does not protect, and the dam-
age awards which appear grossly excessive or completely unfounded.
Somehow, medical practitioners find these two facets of the mal-
practice area intimately related. On the other hand, the legal
practitioner views the elements as independent phases of the law.
Perhaps this legal approach has resulted from the fact that two
traditional law school courses are involved: insurance and dam-
ages; and to the average law student nothing is more unrelated
than a second year course and a third year course. Or, even if
the two courses are studied simultaneously, the final examinations
are given on different days. Hence, the courses remain unconnected.
In law schools which are developing law-medicine programs, the
intimate relevance of several law courses to the practice of medicine
is underscored. The law of insurance and damages is not affecting
medicine in separate vacuums. Instead, the law, with all its rami-
fications, affects the medical profession. Thus, educating the lawyer
and the lawyer-to-be in the wisdom and skill essential to interpret
the law for a professional colleague in medicine is legal education
at its best. This is not the law departmentalized-rather, it is the
law unified. This purpose guides the thoughts of the instant article.
Introduction to Insurance
Prior to a discussion of damages in the modern medical mal-
practice action, it is pertinent to discuss insurance, its coverage,
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and exclusions. There is no extensive legal writing which fully and
adequately covers the many diverse problems which potentially
lurk in the average professional liability policy for medicine. Never-
theless, some case law as well as limited law review investigations
of this complicated and puzzling area exist.' The paucity of legal
literature stands in contradistinction to the almost continuous
preoccupation of medical literature with the problem of malpractice
generally, and insurance in particular.2 In addition to professional
medical journals, the law department of the American Medical
Association has also been active in the study and consideration
of malpractice insurance.3
1 See, e.g., Hirsch, "Insuring Against Medical Professional Liability." 12 Vand.
L. Rev. 667 (1960). This article contains discussions of malpractice insurance cases
existent in 1959. Since 1959, several courts have dealt with medical malpractice in-
surance cases, but no startling developments have occurred. The purpose of the
first portion of the instant article is to analyze all the significant malpractice insurance
cases in the hope of providing the reader with a current guide to this subject. See
also Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 452 (1954), which contains an interesting discussion of
insurance coverage of liability or indemnity policies for physicians, surgeons, dentists,
and the like. This annotation, and the cases therein, replaced the annotation in 104
A.L.R. 1089 (1939), 100 A.L.R. 1450 (1936), and 63 A.L.R. 766 (1929).
2 See, e.g., Committee Report, "Professional Liability & the Physician", 183
A.M.A.J. 695 (1963) ; Nash, "A Statistical Study of Malpractice Liability Insurance
Claims", 61 A.D.A.J. 315 (1960) ; Rees & Whelan, "Professional Liability in Derma-
tology", 86 Arch. of Dermatology 788 (1962) ; Wyckoff, "Effects of a Malpractice
Suit Upon Physicians in Connecticut", 176 A.MA..J. 1096 (1961). The substance
of these particular articles is discussed in depth at notes 4, 6, 20 and 29 infra.
See also Hassard, "Your Malpractice Insurance Contract," 168 A.M.A.J. 2117 (1958) ;
"Review of Medical Claims and Suits," 167 A.M.A.J. 227 (1958) ; "Analysis of Pro-
fessional Liability Claims and Suits," 165 A.M.A.J. 608 (1957); Sandor, "The
History of Professional Liability Suits in the United States," 163 A.M.A.J. 459
(1957); "Study of Medical Professional Liability," 163 A.M.AJ. 364 (1957).
a See the recent Committee Report, "Professional Liability & The Physician",
183 A.M.AJ. 695 (1963). This report notes that medical malpractice claims rose
tenfold between 1930-40, and another tenfold between 1940-50. Furthermore, at least
1/7 of all physicians become defendants in malpractice lawsuits.
The report also listed several factors contributing to the increased incidence of
lawsuits against doctors. Included among these factors are (1) public attitude (2)
effect of juries (3) inflation (4) court extension of doctrines such as res ipsa loquitur
(5) attitudes of plaintiffs' attorneys, and (6) increased hazards of medicine and surg-
ery.
The 1963 report listed eleven criteria which should govern the individual
doctor's choice of malpractice insurance. The doctor should (1) consider the stabil-
ity of the carrier and its reserve capital, (2) where the insurer's reserve capital is on
deposit, (3) the doctor's own philosophy and experience in regard to defending
suits, (4) the sufficiency of the coverage offered, (5) the extent of the cancellation
clause, (6) the extent of the exclusion clause, (7) the extent of the liability coverage,
(8) the insurance company's policy toward annual renewals, (9) the extent of hidden
additional charges in the insurance contract, (10) the insurance company's willingness
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The typical medical liability policy is a surprisingly short and
apparently simple document. This is especially true when it is
compared with the average automobile liability policy or life in-
surance contract.4 The average medical liability policy contains,
in varying lengths and degrees of prolixity, the following elements:
insuring agreement, defense and settlement provisions, conditions,
exclusions, and the other usual impediments of the insurance world.5
To the aggravation of physicians and lawyers, many difficult legal
issues arise within the confines of such simply worded documents.
The Insuring Agreement
Most standard medical insurance policies state that the cover-
age includes "malpractice, error or mistake of the insured" or "acts
or omissions of the insured as a member of a professional board
or committee." 6 Resultant litigation centers about the definition
of "malpractice, error or mistake." I In De Mandre v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 8 an insured hospital's policy expressly excluded liability
for injuries resulting from malpractice, error, or mistake in rendering
professional service or treatment. The hospital failed to provide
sideboards for a patient's bed, and injury resulted when the patient
fell off the bed. On appeal, defendant insurer's motion for summary
to engage in public professional liability preventive programs, and (11) the cost of the
premium.
4 See Rees & Whelan, "Professional Liability in Dermatology", 86 Arch. of
Dermatology 788 (1962), where it is noted that only 256,000 physicians are presently
insured, while 62,000,000 automobile drivers are insured.
5 Hirsch, supra note 1. See also Law Department, "Your Professional Liability",
183 A.M.A.J. 750 (1963).
6 Rees & Whelan, supra note 4. This article is not confined to malpractice insur-
ance for dermatologists. Instead, the statements of the authors also apply to the
general topic of malpractice insurance.
Noting that 6.8% of all physicians are uninsured, the authors naturally made a
strong recommendation for complete coverage. Depending on the circumstances, it
was recommended that doctors should carry at least $100,000 coverage for singular
liability and $300,000 for multiple insurance claims. In light of the increased inci-
dence of malpractice lawsuits and other factors contributing to higher awards to
claimants, it seems that the recommendations of these authors are quite conservative.
7 See, e.g., American Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Michota, 156 Ohio St. 578, 103
N.E2d 817 (1917). There, claimant alleged malpractice because the doctor failed
to lock a treatment chair, causing injury when claimant fell to the floor. The court
held such an incident an accident arising out of the malpractice of insured's profession.
The same result occurred when a safety catch on a treatment table collapsed. See
Harris v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 42 Wash. 2d 655, 257 P2d 221 (1953).
8 264 F2d 70 (5th Cir. 1959). Actually, the key issue on appeal in this case
involved distinguishing a motion for summary judgment under rule 56 and a motion
for judgment on the pleadings under rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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judgment was denied, and the cause was remanded for a new trial.
The reasoning of the court, although obscure, seems in keeping
with the holdings of American Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Michota
and Harris v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co.9
Another physician marked a death certificate with the notation
that decedent died of "criminal negligence at X Sanatorium." Three
years later, a newspaper published a photostatic copy of the certifi-
cate. When the physician sued his insurance company for damages
he sustained as a result of the sanatorium suing the physician, the
court held that the newspaper publication was not related to
professional services, so the doctor could not recover his loss from
the insurer.' °
The far-reaching scope of the terms "error or mistake" in a
statement of coverage was revealed in at least one jurisdiction.
A California court held that they covered liability not based on
malpractice exclusively, but also included liability for injuries re-
sulting from the condition of the physician's property."
If the magic words "error and mistake" include a physician's
property, will they include a medical practitioner's acts beyond
the scope of his practice? An Ohio optometrist injured a patient
while attempting to remove foreign matter from his patient's eye.
His policy provided indemnification due to "malpractice, error or
mistake committed in the practice of optometry." The policy was
held not to indemnify the loss. The restrictive clause limiting the
coverage to the practice of optometry established the outer limits
of "error and mistake." 12
A most abrasive medico-legal issue is generated when a phy-
sician warrants a cure. One court stated that the words "mal-
practice, error or mistake" refer not only to common-law tort
liability, but to all liability including a contract relationship which
the warranty established. Hence, the warranty of cure when
breached was held to be within terms of the policy.' 3 This de-
9 See note 7 supra.
L0 Maier v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 133 Colo. 571, 298 P2d 391 (1956). The
court further indicated the insurer would have been liable for an action arising out
of the statement included in the death certificate, had the doctor not given the defense
to lawyers not approved by the insurer.
1 Burns v. American Cas. Co., 127 Cal. App. 2d 198, 273 P2d 605 (1954).
12 Kime v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 66 Ohio App. 277, 22 N.E2d 1008 (1940).
'3 Sutherland v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 103 Wash. 583, 175 Pac. 187 (1913).
Whether a malpractice action sounds in tort or contract usually involves the issue
of which statute of limitations should apply, because most state statutes of limitations
provide a longer period of time for contracts than for torts. Thus, it is often to the
claimant's advantage to allege and prove a contract action, in addition to a tort
action, especially when the time period allowed for torts has almost terminated. See,
e.g., Noel v. Proud, 189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61 (1961).
[Vol. 25
1964] DAMAGE AWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 327
cision might have been different if the terms had not included
"mistake or error." Even though the physician did make a special
contract, the policy operated because the warranty was made in
the practice of a profession and was an understanding which the
doctor clearly had a right to make. Most active practitioners, both
in law and medicine, identify this rule as wise. Some judicial
decisions, however, hold that the special contract warranting cure
which is breached is not within the terms "malpractice, error or
mistake." 14 An important contribution to the effective meshing of
law and medicine could be accomplished by the insurance coverage
of such warranties which are common and fundamental to medical
practice.
Most courts draw narrowly the insurer's liability for acts of
the physician's assistants or employees." A patient operated upon
and injured by an unregistered, unlicensed assistant acting in viola-
tion of a dentist's instructions created an uninsured incident, even
though violation of the dentist's instructions was the direct cause
of the injury."0 A policy covering loss against liability for "error
or mistake or malpractice by any assistant in the employ of the
assured while acting under the assured's instructions" did not cover
a loss from treatment by an assistant without the supervision or
instruction of the assured. The assistant was acting in the line of
his employment according to previous general instructions and
prevailing custom under the employment contract. The court said
that, under the contract, the insurer did not undertake to answer
for the mistake or malpractice of a doctor's helper acting on his
own responsibility, without advice or directions, because the sub-
ordinate was unknown to the insurer.-7
Once again the medico-legal relationship suffers difficulty,
for modern medical practice demands extensive use of assistants
and employees who operate under general instructions. More
understandable is the situation where the physician uses an un-
qualified, unlicensed assistant. The insurer's contract responsibility
requires greater care from the doctor. Insurance coverage in such
situations should be and is denied.'" However, the needs of medical
education were not enhanced by one court which denied coverage
to a coroner who permitted members of a medical school patho-
logical department to perform an autopsy on the plaintiff's deceased
husband. The liability of the physician was held not to be within
14 See 70 CJ.S., Physicians & Surgeonw § 57 (1951).
15 See Annot. 35 A.LR2d 452, 455-57 (1954).
16 Betts v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 90 N.J.L. 632, 101 AtI. 257 (1917).
1'7 Seay v. Georgia Life Ins., 132 Tenn. 673, 179 S.W. 312 (1951).
18 Glesby v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 89, 44 P.2d 365 (1935).
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the scope of a policy indemnifying him against suiits based on "mal-
practice, error, negligence or mistake." Though the policy referred
specifically to autopsies, the action was against him in his capacity
as a coroner, not as physician, and so he was not protected. 9
The importance of insurance coverage in medical practices
covering several phases of medicine must be resolved by proper
contract arrangements to prevent what appears to physicians as
obsessive, picayune detail. Court decisions after such misfortunes
irritate the law-medicine relationship. Adequate contractual ar-
rangements should prevent these occurrences. 0
Some policies include within their insuring agreement coverage
against accidental injuries. One policy insured a physician against
liability for injuries "accidentally suffered" from treatment by use
of a hair removal machine and injury caused by the constant
application of X-rays. Thus, even though the patient "intention-
ally" submitted to, and the doctor "intentionally" applied the
treatment the court held for the plaintiff physician because an
accident had occurred.2'
Defense and Settlement Issues
Perhaps the most important consideration from the physician's
point of view is the right to demand that the insurance company
procure his assent to any proposed settlement. A physician insured
with otherwise adequate protection may find that his policy gives
19 Crenshaw v. U.S. Fed. & Guar. Co., 193 S.W2d 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946).
20 See, e.g., Wyckoff, "The Effects of a Malpractice Suit Upon Physicians in
Connecticut", 176 A.M.A.J. 1096 (1961). The author of this article, which was
based on a thorough survey of physicians in Connecticut, pointed out that most
physicians have a great fear of malpractice claims because such lawsuits directly
affect the individual's business, even if the claimant loses. Thus, doctors are now
looking to malpractice insurance, in addition to "public education" programs to recoup
possible losses. The provisions of the contract can be extremely important. For
example, in American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Goff, 281 F2d 689 (9th Cir. 1960),
the policy provided that no coverage would result if the insured had previous claims
of malpractice or loss of previous insurance. A party had threatened suit, but never
pressed his claim. The court found for the insured doctor because of the ambiguity
in the term "claim." At least in this case, the doctor -won. However, it is apparent
that when recovery from the insurer is finally based on the interpretation of one
word, the situation is not the most desirable. Thus, the physician would be wise
to know the terms of the insurance contract beforehand. In regard to ambiguities
in malpractice and hospital insurance contracts, see, e.g., Douglas v. American
Cas. Co., 106 Ga. App. 744, 128 S.E.2d 364 (1962); Cottrill v. Michigan Hosp.
Serv., 359 Mich. 472, 102 N.W2d 179 (1960); Tenney v. American Life & Acc.
Ins. Co., 338 S.W.2d 370 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co.
v. Houston, 360 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962); Street v. Continental Cas. Co.,
339 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1960).
21 Shaw v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 101 F2d 92 (3d Cir. 1938).
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him no voice in cases where his professional reputation is at stake.
Case law involving these provisions is non-existent. At least one
authority, however, recommends that adequate coverage include
the physician's written consent to any settlement.22
While most policies provide only for the defense of claims
which are within the policy's protection, some insurance policies
will provide defense of any claim as far as legal services are con-
cerned.3 Typical is the policy which will defend but not pay any
judgment based on a verdict arising out of the performance of a
criminal act. If an insurer agrees to pay all legal expenses and to
defend all suits, but refuses to pay the legal counsel employed, the
physician may pay the legal fees. He does not thereby become a
volunteer. He acquires an assignment of the attorney's claim
against the insurer and can recover his expenditure. 4
Conditions of the Contract
The term "condition" embraces those terms of the contract
distinctly labeled as such.25 It also includes terms embracing repre-
sentations, understandings, and the like, which relate not only to
what the physician says he is and does, but also to what he must
do once a claim is asserted against him. If a practitioner represents
that he is a member in good standing in a state dental society
when he secures his policy, his acceptance of a renewal of his policy
represents the same effect. If he failed to pay his dues and was
not in good standing, the insurer is entitled to cancel. 6
The condition of cooperation requires prompt notice as well
as a full and frank disclosure of all elements of the claim. When a
physician is sued, he is entitled as a matter of right to his expenses
for travel arising from the litigation. But he has no claim for
professional services as a witness in his own case. 7 Other conditions
concern direct action against the company. Such clauses usually
establish certain conditions precedent, as well as apportionment
among any other insurance companies which may be involved 3
Usually, this part of the policy also states the policy limits, often
22 See Hirsch, supra note 1. Naturally, the medical profession is very in-
terested in the settlement of malpractice claims. It has been estimated that 10%
of all settlement cases have been in favor of the plaintiff. See Rees & Whelan, supra
note 4, at 789.
23 See, e.g., Todd v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 48 Ohio App. 459, 194 N.E. 431 (1934).
24 Seay v. Georgia Life Ins., supra note 17.
25 See Hirsch, supra note 1.
26 U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Fridrich, 23 N.J. Eq. 437, 198 Atl. 378 (1938).
27 Medical Protective Co. v. Light, 48 Ohio App. 508, 194 N.E. 446 (1934).
28 See, e.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Goff, 281 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1960).
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a matter of deep concern to the physician. Should he assume only
a minimum dollar protection to discourage litigation as some in-
surance companies suggest? 29 Litigation will occur despite dollar
limits, for the economic reputation of physicians is that of high
income. It is therefore better to obtain the protection of maximum
dollar limits. Indeed, many physicians now carry one hundred
thousand to three hundred thousand dollars coverage. °
Exclusions from the Contract
The most common exclusion provision which creates issues
in malpractice insurance litigation is the so-called "criminal acts"
exclusion. While certain acts are obviously criminal (abortion),
other acts are not so obvious (assault and battery from lack of
consent).
One court has held that the failure to obtain consent to therapy
did not constitute criminal assault and battery as that term was
intended under the policy which excluded acts involving assault
and battery from policy coverage. But if the patient's injuries
were caused by the unlicensed and therefore criminal practice of
the physician's assistant, the insured's liability was not within
the coverage. Where the unlawful act was not the direct cause
of injury, one court suggested that the policy should protect the
doctor.2 But the court held that no legal obstacle exists to the
parties agreeing to the basis of liability.
Other exclusions typically involve X-ray apparatus, partnership
liability, and the acts of unlicensed assistants. A recent case denied
recovery from an insurer by a physician who settled a malpractice
claim arising from the wrongful act of an assistant physician who
handled calls for the insured physician. The policy had limited
coverage to the insured doctor "acting professionally or by assistant
in the practice of his profession." Assistant was further defined
not to include:
a physician, surgeon, dentist or x-ray technician employed by
the insured except while acting under the insured's instructions
29 It has been estimated that payments of malpractice claims have increased 239o
in between 1950-60, while the number of claims have increased by only 9.8% in the
same period. Thus, the suggestion that only minimum dollar protection would be
adequate does not seem reasonable. On the contrary, it would seem that inaximnum
dollar protection should be the rule. See Nash, "A Statistical Study of Malpractice
& Liability Insurance Claims," 61 A.M.A.J. 315 (1960).
30 Supra note 6.
31 Glesby v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., supra note 18.
32 Betts v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., supra note 16.
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(a) in the care and treatment of a patient personally attended by
the insured or (b) in the performance of an autopsy.33
Time Limits of Contract Coverage
The calendar also plays an important role in insurance cov-
erage. Annual premiums must be based on actuarial risks for
sound insurance economics. If a patient receives a series of treat-
ments, the first portion may have been given when no insurance
coverage existed for no policy had been written. The final portion
of treatments may result when a policy is in effect. If the injury
to the patient by malpractice standards resulted from the therapy
during the final portion of treatment, or if the final treatments
alone did no injury but did cause harm when added to the first
treatments, then the insurer is liable and the insured is covered.3 4
This sophisticated law is bottomed on the simple rule that the
insurer is liable only for such malpractice which occurs during the
effective dates of the policy's operation. 5 An insurer who declines
to defend a physician when the treatment series extends over
periods of both no coverage and coverage must reimburse the
physician for the amount he expends as the result of the malprac-
tice litigation.36
A most serious pitfall for the practitioner can result if the
policy is limited to actions brought within two months after the
expiration of the policy.31 Courts will say the contract is binding,
the provision is not ambiguous and consequently the insurer is
not required to defend.38 Doctors, who often purchase insurance
with naivete, will not have anticipated this result.
Notice to the Insurer
Most malpractice insurance contracts establish a method by
which the insured physician must notify his insurer as to claims
against him and the like. Rigid as some of these requirements may
seem in print, courts have generally favored the insured, stating
that reasonable notice under the circumstances is adequate. A
recent case stated that the question of adequate notice, although
33 O'Neil v. Glen Falls Indem. Co., 310 F2d 165, 166 (8th Cir. 1962).
34 Shaw v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., supra note 21.
35 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 89 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1937).
36 Waterman v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 209 Il. App. 284 (1917).
37 See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 547 (1963). This annotation covers the general law
of insurance involving the renewal of insurance policies.
38 Lehr v. Professional Underwriters, 296 Mich. 693, 296 N.W. 843 (1941). Cf.
Heins, "Insured and Discovered Losses in Malpractice Insurance," 24 Ins. LJ. 399
(1955).
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a condition precedent to the insurer's liability, is nevertheless a
mixed question of law and fact." Thus, such an issue is to be
determined by the jury.
Contractual Conclutsions
The doctor seeking insurance protection from malpractice
litigation must exercise preventive law. Before purchase, the need
to understand what he is purchasing is paramount. The compre-
hension of what he lacks in insurance coverage is mandatory. The
piecemeal interpretation of contractual rights and duties provided
by judicial decisions is not conducive to satisfactory medical prac-
tice. Legal issues arising from patients' claims which set forth
breach of warranties, misrepresentations, criminal acts, conceal-
ments, and the multitude of legal technicalities only confuse mal-
practice insurance, depreciate professional services, and destroy a
healthy law-medicine relationship. Insurance carriers and medical
societies should be able to construct that degree of medico-legal
understanding which permits malpractice insurance to better ful-
fill its role in the health science practice.
DAMAGE AWARDS
General Trends
Much like the malpractice insurance law, there have been few
recent malpractice cases involving the amount of damages awarded
as a key issue before the appellate courts. Nevertheless, the opin-
ions are illustrative of the various courts' policies toward dam-
ages in such cases. The holdings are generally divisible into three
categories: (1) where the jury award was reduced by the judge
under his authority to remit,40 (2) where the jury award was
affirmed,4' and (3) where no recovery was allowed.42 Moreover,
89 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Dittoro, 206 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
40 See, e.g., Lates v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 241 N.Y.S.2d 17
(Sup. Ct 1963); Farrell v. Lavine, 236 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Ribando v.
American Cyanamid Co.,-235 N.Y.S2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1962); McCrain v. Health Ins.
Plan of Greater New York, 207 N.Y.S.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
41 See, e.g., Dietz v. King, 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960); Moore v. Webb,
345 S.W2d 239 (Ct. App. Kan. 1961); Ehrlichman v. Feldman, 231 N.Y.S.2d 390
(Sup. Ct. 1962); Gonzales v. Peterson, 57 Wash. 2d 676, 359 P2d 307 (1961);
Fehrman v. Smirl, 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W. 2d 255 (1963), rehearing denied, 20
Wis. 2d 1, 122 N.W2d 439 (1963).
42 See, e.g., Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E2d 436 (Ct. App. 1963);
Deutsch v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 240 N.Y.S2d 576 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Kraus v. Spiel-
berg, 236 N.Y.S2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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most of the cases arose in the State of New York.43 A substantial
number of the recent cases involved remittiturs imposed either by
the appellate court, or by the appellate court's affirming a trial
judge's remittitur.
Remittiturs
Basically, remittiturs occur when either the trial judge or
appellate court substantially disagrees with the jury award. The
disagreement may be due to various reasons, although it is usually
stated that the remittitur is necessary because the facts of the
case do not justify the amount of the verdict. 44 Most courts apply
a "shock the conscience" test on the appellate level,45 but leave
great discretion to the trial judge because of his close proximity
to the facts of the case.46 At the same time, courts which impose
remittiturs will often use particular circumstances of the fact
situation to enunciate a policy which favors the concept.47
43 Of 14 cases involving the issue of damages on appeal, 7 were from New York.
It is also interesting to note that not one of the New York cases reached that state's
court of appeals. Thus, it may be concluded that the plaintiffs were satisfied with
the remittiturs imposed and also felt that the no recovery decisions were acceptable,
however disagreeable the results may have seemed.
44 See, e.g., Barnes V. Bovenmyer, 122 N.W2d 312 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1963).
This case succinctly states the damages rules generally applicable in malpractice
cases. Furthermore, it contains a good statement on how to build a malpractice case,
including the elements of proof necessary and the causation factors. See generally,
Morris, "Malpractice: Medical-The Important Events of the Last Two Years," 30
Ins. Counsel J. 44 (1963); Note, "Theory of a Medical Malpractice Action-Time
Limitation and Damages", 64 W. Va. L. Rev. 413 (1962).
45 See e.g., Leonardo v. Sloan, 23 Pa. D. & C2d 201 (C.P. 1959). In this case,
plaintiff alleged improper X-ray treatments which caused serious third degree burns,
in addition to the high probability that cancer would result. The jury awarded
plaintiff $18,500 and this verdict was upheld on appeal. The court stated at page 215
that damages in such a case would not be reduced on appeal unless they were "so
grossly excessive as to shock the court's sense of justice"
46 See, e.g., French v. Fischer, 362 S.W,2d 926 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962). Here,
the classic sponge left in the patient situation occurred in an operation on a two week
old child. The court reduced the father's recovery for loss of services, giving no
reason other than the fact that such a remittitur is within the trial judge's discretion.
47 Compare McCrain v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 207 N.Y.S2d
685 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (conduct of plaintiff justified remittitur), with Farrell v.
Lavine, 236 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (loss of services of three year old child
can be only nominal). These two cases in particular illustrate the necessity of reading
between the lines of the remittitur opinion. Close reading indicates both courts "felt"
the jury awards were simply too great. But neither court would reach a decision
without attaching some importance to the fact situation. This, at least, is encouraging
because some cases refuse to even discuss the facts of the situation at all. See note
59 in !ra.
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Examples
In Ribando v. American Cyanamid Co.,48 plaintiff was awarded
10,000 dollars for injuries which resulted from a broken hypodermic
needle which was lodged in the claimant's rectal area. On appeal,
the court recognized 'that malpractice was proved, but reduced
the award to 7,500 dollars. The court pointed to the fact that
plaintiff had suffered rectal pain before the negligent insertion of
the needle. Thus, it was reasoned that most of the pain and suffer-
ing was not due to the negligent act and "therefore" the remittitur
was imposed.
It is submitted that the court's logic was not perfect. Instead,
it seems likely that the Ribando case exemplifies a policy of reducing
malpractice awards. 49 This policy is doubtlessly grounded on the
well-known fact that juries generally assume doctors have wealth
and should reimburse the suffering injured patient."'
The policy which apparently favors remittitur in malpractice
cases often results in rather odd statements by a court. Farrell v.
Lavine 51 involved a father's recovery for loss of services of his three-
year old child due to a negligently formed spica cast. The son and
father were each awarded 2,500 dollars, but the trial judge reduced
the father's amount to 1,500 dollars.52  Naturally, the father ap-
48 235 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Another important issue in this case
involved the matter of submitting the issue of improper care of the hypodermic
needle in the absence of any expert testimony. The court cited the well-known
general principle that expert testimony is not necessary if the matter at hand is within
a lay jury's comprehension. In Ribando, it was apparent that the surgical needle was
not properly tested. In fact, defendant admitted his unfamiliarity with the particular
needle used. See generally 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons § 62 (1951), and
cases cited therein.
49 The 1962 Belli Seminar indicates that damage awards for torts in certain
states, such as New York, have been lower. Included in this category of cases,
naturally, are the recoveries for malpractice. Since most of the recent malpractice
cases involving damages occurred in New York, this article's analysis substantiates
Mr. Belli's thesis. This is especially true in the remittitur cases. See 12 Belli, Trial
and Tort Trends 9 (1963).
50 See Committee Report, "Professional Liability & The Physician," 183 A.M.A.J.
695 (1963).
51 236 N.Y.S2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
52 It is interesting to note that the Farrell case involved a good deal of expert
testimony regarding the use of the spica cast on the child. According to the expert
testimony, the spica cast is not generally used in cases of broken femurs. However,
the community standard of care did permit such usage. Thus, the court approved
the use of the spica cast, and therefore, negligence could not be proved by the use
of that cast alone. On community standard of care, see George v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
215 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. La. 1963) ; Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E2d
436 (1963); Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963).
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pealed. However, the trial judge's decision was affirmed not only
because the jury award exceeded the claim stated on the petition,
but also because the loss of services of a three year old child could
only be "nominal." A literal interpretation of the court's reasoning
would indicate that the father would have better profited if his
son had been killed by the defendant's negligence. Needless to
say, the language of the court makes sense only if read in the
context of a policy favoring remittiturs in malpractice cases.
Appellate courts often base a remittitur on the conduct of the
plaintiff. As noted previously, plaintiff can be guilty of contribu-
tory negligence in a tort action for malpractice. 53 In McCrain v.
Healttk Ins. Plan of Greater New Yorka 4 plaintiff pleaded and
proved that defendant had negligently treated a fractured arm,
in addition to not discovering a fractured hip. The jury award
was 114,600 dollars, even though the plaintiff was a most difficult
patient, often leaving the hospital without permission, constantly
ignoring medical advice as to proper care, and generally wreaking
havoc with the hospital staff.5 On appeal, the award was reduced
to 60,000 dollars. Noting the plaintiff's recalcitrant behavior, the
court reasoned that much of the pain and suffering was actually
caused by the plaintiff. Also tempering the court's decision was
the fact that expert testimony proved there was little chance for
complete cure at any stage of the convalescence.
Perhaps one of the more interesting points of the McCrain
case involved the appellate court's statement that plaintiff ob-
tained a sympathy verdict. In light of the "passion and prejudice"
principle " followed by many courts in remittitur situations, it is
53 See text at note 14 supra and 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 51 (1951).
54 207 N.Y.S2d 685 (Sup. Ct. 1960). In all remittitur cases, the plaintiff is
given an option of either accepting the reduced figure or of having a new trial. As
stated previously, research disclosed that all the plaintiffs involved in the instant
cases accepted the remittiturs imposed upon them. Perhaps such results indicate
that the remittiturs were still of a greater sum than that for which the defendant
was willing to settle. And naturally, most litigants are not unmindful of the high
costs of appeal, in addition to the amount of time ordinarily consumed by the ap-
pellate process.
55 The plaintiff proved to the jury that his conduct did not actually contribute
to his pain and suffering. Nevertheless, the appellate court heavily relied on such
behavior in reducing the damages awarded. Thus, in McCrain, the court actually
delved into the fact situation, impliedly concluding that the jury was incorrect in its
conclusion regarding plaintiff's conduct. Query, is an offshoot of the "substantial
error" rule normally used by court's to reverse a verdict? Or, on the other hand,
does it indicate a modem trend of appellate courts often delving into the fact
situations-a province once wholly thought of as the jury's?
56 Supra note 45.
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probably correct to assume a remittitur would have been awarded
solely on the basis of the sympathy verdict.T
As is true in many areas of law, a court's purported reasoning
in a malpractice case will often have little to do with the true
rationale behind the decision. Instead, a well-known and long
standing policy such as charitable immunity will truly govern the
case.5 Students of law quickly grasp the meaning of such decisions,
and are able to maintain a reasonable amount of predictability for
future cases. However, some of the malpractice cases which involve
the issue of damages fall victim to a remittitur opinion totally
lacking in explanation. Lates v. Health Ins. Plan" involved such
a situation. There the court simply reduced a pain and suffering
award from 22,000 to 5,000 dollars. The decision was purportedly
based on the "law and facts," although no law was cited and
no facts were given. The methodology is efficient, but it does
present the lawyer with unanswerable questions.
The recent cases indicate that if at all possible, appellate
courts will attempt to apply a remittitur in a malpractice case.
Although such a policy may grate upon the soul of a plaintiff's
attorney because his expectations of predictability are diminished,
it does recognize the fact that juries often do not favor defendant
doctors. 60
Are remittiturs in malpractice cases increasing? 61 This prob-
lem is actually beyond the scope of the present article. However,
if the recent cases are indicative, it would seem that remittiturs
are increasing in favor if not money amounts.
56 This conclusion is especially in keeping with an analysis of the recent re-
mittitur cases. The appellate courts are generally quite anxious to discover whether
passion or prejudice influenced the jury's verdict. See Belli, 12 Trial and Tort Trends
362-79 (1963).
58 Actually, charitable immunity is seemingly on the decline compared with the
strict views held in most jurisdictions even one decade past. However, there still is
strong impetus to continue the doctrine in the form of legislation. For example, the
recent session of the Ohio General Assembly was quite involved with a hospital
immunity proposal. Blending the concepts of charitable immunity and hospital im-
munity in general, the bill would have limited the actual liability for malpractice
to the doctors and nurses in a case, excluding the hospital. The bill (S. B. 66) was
passed in the Senate but was indefinitely postponed June 28, 1963, in the Elections
and Federal Relations Committee of the House of Representatives.
50 241 N.Y.S.2d 17 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
60 See the interesting discussion in Shartel & Plant, Law of Medical Practice
158-63 (1959).
61 Of the 14 cases involved with this portion of the article, seven involved
instances of remittiturs. Of the 14 recent cases, only 3 resulted in no recovery,
either by reversing the trial verdict or by upholding a trial judge's dismissal. How-
ever, it is quite likely that unknown numbers of cases were dismissed at the trial
stage and because no appeal was taken, no appellate record exists of such cases.
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Award of Jury Completely Reversed- No Recovery
Recent instances of no recovery have not occurred as often as
instances of remittitur. However, the same reasons given to sub-
stantiate remittiturs are often employed to justify no recovery in
malpractice actions. The tried and true no facts, no law, no
reasoning decisions appear, in addition to cases which hold that
plaintiff's contributory negligence justifies no award. Finally, the
law affords doctors a certain amount of leeway for honest errors
of judgment or mistaken diagnosis. The latter category of cases,
naturally, always absolves the defendant doctor from liability.
Examples
In Deutscr v. Doctors' Hosp., Inc., 2 defendants hospital and
the involved doctors were accused of malpractice causing brain
damage to a newly-born child. The jury found for the plaintiff
in the sum of 187,000 dollars. However, the appellate court re-
versed per curiam, stating that the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence and that the damages were excessive.
Whether the evidence was slim and the award excessive in
Deutsch will remain an unanswered question because no real rea-
sons were given and no authority was cited. 3 This type of case
drives a lawyer to distraction. An attorney should have a certain
amount of reasonable expectations in most lawsuits. A case with
no reason and no authority does not yield such a result. Surely
the reversal of a jury award of 187,000 dollars is worthy of some
comment.
True, the Deutsch case may have involved a passion and
prejudice verdict. A child injured for life, with a jury of mothers,
could raise a high probability of a high verdict. Nevertheless, the
courts should not leave such imagined possibilities to the reader.
Instead, the elements constituting passion and prejudice should be
listed. Such a practice would benefit the legal and medical pro-
fessions, as well as the individual parties to the case.
Gault v. SidemanA4 exemplifies how plaintiff's contributory
negligence can result in no recovery. This case was originally
62 240 N.Y.S2d (Sup. Ct. 1963).
63 Naturally, there is conflict among various legal philosophers regarding the
primacy of reasonable expectations. Some, such as Pound, say that certainty in law
is more desirable than justice in a particular case. Others, like Llewellyn, disagree
because of the feeling that justice in a particular case is the primary goal of law.
64 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 191 N.E.2d 436 (1963). In a quite distinct opinion, the
court carefully listed the elements necessary to prove malpractice in tort or contract.
In malpractice actions based on tort, the court stated that plaintiff must carry the
burden of proof in showing a lack of ordinary care to prove negligence. Further-
more, the court pointed out that in such tort actions, plaintiff could be guilty of
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brought in tort, but amended pleadings made it a contract action.
Plaintiff based his claim on alleged malpractice in the removal of a
ruptured disc. The court took special pains to delineate the differ-
ences between tort and contract actions because contributory neg-
ligence is no defense to a contract action, while it is to a tort action. 5
Influenced perhaps by the fact that the contract action was a
seeming afterthought and that neither a writing nor the requisite
contractual conduct of the parties existed, the court found no
contract. Thus, the case was decided on the basis of tort law.66
The court found no breach of duty by defendants in that the
community standard of care was met. Furthermore, it was stated
that plaintiff's conduct "probably" caused most of the injury. Thus,
the trial judge's directed verdict was affirmed.67
Cases of no recovery also are grounded on the fact that the
doctor made an honest error of judgment or diagnosis.68 The rea-
soning of such cases merely recognizes that physicians are human
and therefore can err.
In Kraus v. Spielburg,69 a rather weird fact situation occurred.
The defendant physician falsely told plaintiff that tuberculosis
germs had probably entered her stomach and immediate chemo-
therapy was needed. The doctor was not sure of this particular
contributory negligence. On the other hand, in contract actions for malpractice, it
was recognized that conflicting views existed. Some courts will apply the ordinary
laws of contract applicable in commercial law cases. But the instant court recognized
that its own public policy provided that the patient-physician relationship contract
simply is not similar to a commercial contract. Thus, clear and convincing evidence
would be necessary to prove the existence of a contract arising out of the physician-
patient relationship.
65 Distinguishing between the malpractice cause of action in tort and contract,
the court stated that in the tort action plaintiff has the burden of proof, must show
a lack of ordinary care, and could be guilty of contributory negligence. On the other
hand, in the contract action, plaintiff must first prove the existence of a contract to
establish consequent rights under it. The court recognized that some jurisdictions
will apply mercantile contract rules in malpractice cases, but found such a view con-
trary to the jurisdiction's public policy.
6 See generally 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 58 (1961) and cases cited
therein.
67 See Shartel & Plant, op. cit., supra note 60, at 152-58 (1959).
68 See 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 58 (1951). Such conclusions, it is
submitted, are just in nature. True, a doctor occupies a unique position in our
society, in that his job often involves the maintenance of human life. Still, it would
be gross to conclude that because of his position, a doctor is somehow exalted to a
position higher than that of any ordinary human being. The law refuses to recognize
such a belief and thus affords the medical profession the fact that doctors are human
beings and are prone to error. Any differing belief would seem contrary to common
sense.
69 236 N.Y.S2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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diagnosis, but he knew the plaintiff was generally tubercular and
needed immediate help. His thought was to frighten plaintiff into
submitting to the treatment. Plaintiff, however, felt the frighten-
ing act was so convincing that she should be allowed recovery for
the psychic injuries which resulted. Both the trial and appellate
courts recognized that the doctor was wrong in his method. 70 It
was stated that perhaps if nothing else were wrong with the plain-
tiff, the outcome of the case would have been different. However,
the fact that plaintiff did have tuberculosis tempered the court's
reasoning process. Although defendant's method was not consid-
ered the best advisable, the courts excused it in light of the
circumstances.
This particular decision appears just. Often, recalcitrant pa-
tients refuse to submit to treatment because of a basic distrust of
medical men, even though the circumstances might be quite dire
indeed. Furthermore, many jurisdictions find it difficult to associate
mental pain and suffering without a physical chain of causation.
This latter factor may also have influenced the court's verdict. 1
The small number of recent "no recovery" cases makes it im-
possible to ascertain a recent trend. Thus, the reader is left to his
own conclusions. However, it should be noted once more that the
no reasons, no authority cases are not palatable professionally to
either lawyers or doctors.
Adequate Damages
Several cases have upheld the damages awarded, and for
various reasons. Naturally, an example of the "no reason" cases
exists. Nevertheless, several other decisions list certain elements
necessary in upholding the damages awarded by a jury.
In Ehidichma v. Feldheim,72 plaintiff alleged osteopathic mal-
practice in which the defendant negligently inserted a needle into
a back muscle, causing the collapse of a lung. The jury awarded
plaintiff 7,500 dollars and her husband 1,500 dollars for loss of
services. The court, although giving no reasons, accepted the jury's
70 Obviously, the defendant was attempting to apply common sense psychology
to convince a patient that treatment was an immediate necessity. If the patient is
somewhat uneducated and is habitually distrustful of medical men, is there any other
alternative available to persuade the patient that the situation is serious? The court
gave no other alternative, which was unfortunate, because many physicians faced
with similar circumstances would like to know the proper method to employ.
71 See Prosser, Torts § 18 (2d ed. 1955).
72 231 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1962). In this case, defendant admitted unfamiliar-
ity with the needle used. He made a rather unique defense of coincidence, alleging that
the injury and breaking of the needle were related events. Perhaps this defense
was particularly indigestible to the court and influenced the outcome of the case.
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verdict. It was stated that plaintiff met her burden of proof and
the requisite causal connection existed.
Gonzales v. Peterson73 involved a claim of malpractice by a
high school athlete. Plaintiff broke an ankle while playing football
and the cast was set by a doctor who then retired. The defendant
took over the case and removed the cast. He failed to take any
subsequent X-rays, but told plaintiff things would be all right.
Plaintiff suffered further injury. The jury awarded 450 dollars for
pain and suffering. Dissatisfied with the low award, plaintiff ap-
pealed, claiming he should have recovered for the lost opportunity
of employment. The court rejected this contention, apparently
relying on the fact that plaintiff's student status removed him from
the usual category of recovery for lost employment. Furthermore,
it was stated that the damages could only be related to the negli-
gence of defendant. Thus, since plaintiff actually broke the ankle,
defendant could not be responsible for that particular pain and
suffering. However, there was a breach of duty, but 450 dollars
was considered adequate damages.
Was not the court correct in its analysis? True, it is sometimes
difficult to draw the line between suffering caused by malpractice
and suffering caused by the injury itself and not due to malprac-
tice. The fact of malpractice should not of itself make the defend-
ant liable for absolutely everything related to the injury. Instead,
most authorities consider justice is accomplished for both parties
when damages are recovered only for injuries caused by the doctor's
negligent act.74
The sponge left in the body after surgery is familiar to every-
one.75 Today, it is generally recognized that liability will result.
However, Dietz v. King 76 is indicative of how the courts may
meticulously analyze such a situation, instead of indiscriminately
giving the plaintiff an award. In Dietz, an operation for breast can-
cer was performed. Plaintiff slipped into a state of shock, and the
surgery was hastily completed. As a result, a sponge was left in
plaintiff's body and was not discovered until a subsequent trip to
England. The jury awarded 6,000 dollars plus costs. On appeal,
the case was affirmed. The interesting portion of the case, how-
ever, is the reasoning used to ascertain the limits of damages. The
73 57 Wash. 2d 676, 359 P2d 307 (1961).
74 See, e.g., Bockman v. Butler, 226 Ark. 159, 288 S.W.2d 597 (1956) ; Beauchamp
v. Davis, 309 Ky. 397, 217 S.W.2d 822 (1948) ; Olsen v. McAtee, 181 Ore. 503, 182
P.2d 979 (1947).
75 70 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons § 66 (1951) lists several cases on the
subject. In fact, the sponge left in the body has become a classic illustration of
medical negligence.
76 184 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Va. 1960).
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court stated that the operation could not be considered malpractice
because of the emergency situation which developed. Instead, the
malpractice occurred when defendant failed to take X-rays after
the operation to determine whether the surgery had been effective.
Dentists often are involved in malpractice cases because it is
alleged that the wrong teeth were removed.77 In Moore v. Webb'7s
plaintiff complained of all her teeth being removed while she was
under anesthetic. Defendants claimed estoppel because authority
for such removal was granted by plaintiff when she signed a
"referral" card. Plaintiff was awarded 5,500 dollars, and this was
affirmed on appeal. The court pointed out that commercial con-
tract law is not followed in malpractice cases because the physician-
patient relationship does not arise from any such contract, but
rather from the trust, confidence, and special nature of the rela-
tionship. Thus, estoppel would not apply because plaintiff believed
that certain teeth were to be removed, not all of them.
Analysis of this case is quite illuminating to both potential
plaintiffs and defendants. Obviously, any doctor should realize
that a mere written form will not always limit liability or grant him
authority. Indeed, it would seem likely that serious explanation of
such a card's contents is necessary, otherwise it might be a nullity.79
On the other hand, plaintiffs should not assume that they have no
worries as far as written forms are concerned. Instead, it is sug-
gested that the facts of the Moore case prejudiced the court into
such one-sided inclinations. For generally speaking, there can be
contracts which alter the normal patient-physician relationship. 80
Perhaps the most interesting of the recent malpractice cases
involving damages is Fehrman v. Smirl.81 There, the Wisconsin
court finally recognized res ipsa loquitur, which subject is beyond
the scope of this article. For purposes of this analysis, however,
other considerations are important. Plaintiff claimed malpractice
in a prostate gland operation which caused impotency and loss of
control over urinary activities. Amidst conflicting expert testi-
mony, erroneous instructions, and the like, the appellate court
granted defendant's motion for new trial. The Wisconsin special
verdict had resulted in 115,000 dollars damages for plaintiff,
although the defendants were found not liable. Thus, the court
upheld the damages awarded, but granted a new trial on liability.
77 See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 320 (1961); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1, 61-76 (1950).
78 345 S.W2d 239 (Kan. Ct. App. 1961).
79 Supra note 64.
80 See 70 CJ.S. Physicians & Surgeons § 66 (1951).
81 20 Wis. 2d 1, 121 N.W2d 255, rehearing denied, 122 N.W2d 439 (1963).
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Relation Between Insurance Coverage and Aonount of Verdict
An important problem exists when a malpractice judgment
rendered against a physician exceeds the coverage limits of the
insurance policy. True, the insurer usually agrees to defend the
physician, but generally only to the limits of the policy. As a
consequence, the insured often pays the amount of the judgment
which is beyond those limits. Here is where the laws of damages
and insurance squarely meet.
The traditional law of insurance and damages has favored, as
a matter of policy, the rule that the insurer is liable only for the
amount of coverage stated in the policy.8 2 There are indications,
however, that this law is changing.83 Some cases have recently
held that the insurer is liable for the total amount of the judgment,
even in excess of the coverage, because the insurer controlled the
entire lawsuit and because of a changing public policy."4
Will this recent trend grow? Will it apply to physicians and
their malpractice insurers? These questions form the basis of the
great uncertainty in the area of malpractice insurance. As impor-
tant as this matter is, not one case has risen involving physicians and
liability of the malpractice insurer beyond policy limits. In fact, the
1963 American Medical Association Report has nated the absence of
law in this area and cautions physicians to be aware of possible per-
sonal liability if courts apply the traditional insurance rule. 5
CONCLUSION
Thus, the intricacies of damages awards and the complications
involved in malpractice insurance still exist. The words of caution
promulgated by the A.M.A. only recognize the fact that the mesh-
ing of damages law and insurance law in regard to physicians has
neither been harmonious nor certain. And in some situations, legal
precedent has not even existed. The doctor, lawyer, and insurer
still face certain obstacles for which there is no legal solution.
These parties must rely on their own abilities until courts or legis-
lutures decide who is to pay the amount of judgment beyond the
policy limits, establish a consistent policy in regard to the defini-
tion of the terms "malpractice, error or mistake," and realize that
although physicians sometimes are negligent, the increasingly higher
awards are not helping doctors, insurers, or the public in general.
82 See generally Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 983 (1961).
83 Id. at 985.
84 See, e.g., River Valley Cartage Co. v. Johnston, 104 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1958).
See also 29A Am. Jur., Insurance §§ 1591-94 (1953).
85 Committee Report, "Professional Liability & The Physician", 183 A.M.A.J.
695 (1963). The discussion in note 3 supra is also pertinent to this portion of the
article.
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